Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Policy
Last updated: 2025-01-05
Version: 2.0 (Non-Custodial Remittance Orchestration Platform)
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Policy
Last Updated: 2025-01-05 Effective Date: 2025-01-05 Version: 2.0 (Non-Custodial Remittance Orchestration Platform) Classification: Internal / Compliance
1. Introduction and Scope
1.1 Purpose
This Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Policy ("AML/CTF Policy") establishes DONATION POS L.P. (trading as "PayWolt")'s framework for preventing, detecting, and mitigating the risks of money laundering (ML), terrorist financing (TF), and proliferation financing (PF) in connection with our cross-border remittance orchestration platform.
1.2 PayWolt's Business Model and AML/CTF Role
Critical Context:
PayWolt operates as a technology service provider (TSP) that orchestrates cross-border money transfers between licensed payment service providers. PayWolt does NOT:
- Hold, custody, or transmit customer funds
- Operate as a money transmitter or remittance business
- Issue electronic money
- Provide payment services as defined in PSD2 Article 4
PayWolt's AML/CTF Responsibilities:
While PayWolt is not a regulated payment institution, we implement AML/CTF controls appropriate to our role as a technology platform, including:
- Platform-Level Sanctions Screening: Screening users and transactions against EU, UN, US, and UK sanctions lists
- Transaction Pattern Monitoring: Detecting suspicious orchestration patterns (e.g., rapid corridor switching, structuring across providers)
- Provider Compliance Verification: Ensuring our licensed payment service providers maintain adequate AML/CTF programs
- Cooperation with Authorities: Assisting law enforcement and regulatory authorities as legally required
- Record Keeping: Maintaining transaction orchestration records for regulatory review
Provider AML/CTF Responsibilities:
Our licensed payment service providers (Wise, Flutterwave, Stripe) are independently responsible for:
- Customer Due Diligence (CDD) / Know Your Customer (KYC)
- Identity verification and document retention
- Source of funds / source of wealth verification
- Politically Exposed Person (PEP) screening
- Transaction monitoring for payment execution
- Suspicious Activity Reporting (SARs) to their respective Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)
- AML/CTF compliance in accordance with their licenses
1.3 Scope of Application
This Policy applies to:
| Scope | Coverage |
|---|---|
| Persons | All PayWolt employees, contractors, directors, and agents |
| Services | Cross-border remittance orchestration via the PayWolt Platform |
| Transactions | All transfers orchestrated through the Platform, regardless of amount |
| Geography | All jurisdictions where PayWolt operates or facilitates transfers |
1.4 Regulatory Framework
This Policy is informed by (but does not constitute full compliance with, given PayWolt's non-regulated status):
| Regulation | Jurisdiction | Key Provisions Considered |
|---|---|---|
| 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (EU 2018/843) | European Union | Risk assessment, enhanced due diligence for high-risk third countries |
| 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (EU 2018/1673) | European Union | Criminalization of ML, corporate liability |
| Hellenic Law 4557/2018 | Greece | AML/CTF implementation in Greece |
| Payment Services Directive 2 (EU 2015/2366) | European Union | Strong customer authentication, transaction monitoring |
| FATF Recommendations (2012, as amended) | International | Risk-based approach, beneficial ownership, wire transfer rules (R.16) |
| EU Regulation 2015/847 (Wire Transfer Regulation) | European Union | Information requirements for fund transfers |
Important Note: As a technology platform, PayWolt is not directly subject to licensing requirements under AMLD5/6 or PSD2. However, we implement controls reflecting best practices to:
- Support our providers' AML/CTF compliance
- Protect our business from ML/TF risks
- Demonstrate responsible platform governance to regulators, investors, and partners
2. Governance and Organizational Structure
2.1 AML/CTF Governance Framework
Board of Directors
│
├─► Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
│ │
│ └─► Chief Compliance Officer (CCO)
│ │
│ ├─► AML/CTF Compliance Manager
│ │ │
│ │ ├─► Sanctions Screening Team
│ │ ├─► Transaction Monitoring Team
│ │ └─► Provider Compliance Team
│ │
│ └─► Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO)
│
└─► Chief Technology Officer (CTO)
│
└─► Security & Fraud Prevention Team
2.2 Roles and Responsibilities
2.2.1 Board of Directors
Responsibilities:
- Approve this AML/CTF Policy and material amendments
- Set the organization's risk appetite for ML/TF exposure
- Ensure adequate resources (budget, staffing, technology) for compliance
- Receive quarterly AML/CTF reports from the CCO/MLRO
- Oversee management's implementation of the AML/CTF program
Frequency: Quarterly AML/CTF updates; annual policy review.
2.2.2 Chief Compliance Officer (CCO)
Responsibilities:
- Overall accountability for AML/CTF compliance program
- Report directly to the Board on AML/CTF matters
- Approve provider partnerships from AML/CTF perspective
- Oversee annual enterprise ML/TF risk assessment
- Coordinate with providers on AML/CTF matters
- Liaise with regulators and law enforcement (where applicable)
- Approve high-risk corridors or service expansions
Authority:
- Block high-risk transfers or corridor activations
- Suspend user accounts pending investigation
- Terminate provider relationships for compliance failures
- Access all Platform data for compliance purposes
2.2.3 Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO)
Responsibilities:
- Receive and evaluate internal suspicious activity reports
- Determine whether to file Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) / Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) with relevant FIUs
- Maintain confidential STR/SAR records
- Liaise with Hellenic Authority for Combating Money Laundering and FIUs in other jurisdictions (as appropriate)
- Provide quarterly statistical reports to Board (number of STRs filed, outcomes)
Independence:
- Reports directly to CCO (functionally) and CEO (administratively)
- Protected from retaliation for good-faith reporting
- No conflicting business development responsibilities
Note: Given PayWolt's non-custodial model, STR/SAR filings by PayWolt are rare. Most suspicious activity is reported by providers. PayWolt files STRs only for platform-level suspicions (e.g., coordinated fraud rings using multiple providers).
2.2.4 AML/CTF Compliance Manager
Responsibilities:
- Implement and maintain AML/CTF procedures
- Manage sanctions screening system and watchlist updates
- Oversee transaction pattern monitoring
- Conduct provider AML/CTF due diligence reviews
- Coordinate AML/CTF training programs
- Maintain AML/CTF documentation and audit trail
- Prepare quarterly compliance reports for CCO/MLRO
2.2.5 All Employees
Responsibilities:
- Complete mandatory annual AML/CTF training
- Report suspicious activity to MLRO via internal reporting channel
- Comply with sanctions screening requirements
- Do not "tip off" users about investigations or STR filings
- Escalate compliance concerns without fear of retaliation
3. Risk Assessment
3.1 Enterprise-Wide ML/TF Risk Assessment
PayWolt conducts an annual enterprise-wide ML/TF risk assessment covering:
3.1.1 Inherent Risk Factors
| Risk Category | Factors Assessed | Risk Level Assessment Criteria |
|---|---|---|
| Customer/User Risk | Geographic distribution, transaction volumes, behavior patterns | High: PEPs, sanctioned individuals, high-risk jurisdictions |
| Product/Service Risk | Cross-border remittances, corridor characteristics, speed of transfers | High: Instant transfers, high-value corridors, cash-intensive destinations |
| Geographic Risk | Source/destination countries, FATF compliance, corruption indices | High: FATF blacklist/greylist countries, US/EU sanctioned jurisdictions |
| Provider Risk | Providers' AML/CTF programs, regulatory standing, incident history | High: Providers with recent AML deficiencies, regulatory actions |
| Delivery Channel Risk | Mobile app, API integrations, third-party referrals | High: Non-face-to-face onboarding, anonymous access attempts |
3.1.2 ML/TF Risk Matrix
Overall Risk Calculation:
Overall ML/TF Risk = (Inherent Risk) × (1 - Effectiveness of Controls)
Risk Levels:
| Level | Definition | Treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Low | Minimal ML/TF risk; strong controls | Standard monitoring |
| Medium | Moderate ML/TF risk; adequate controls | Enhanced monitoring |
| High | Elevated ML/TF risk; controls may be insufficient | Heightened due diligence; senior approval required |
| Prohibited | Unacceptable ML/TF risk | Service not offered; relationship declined/exited |
3.2 Corridor-Specific Risk Assessment
Each transfer corridor (e.g., "Nigeria → Germany", "Ghana → United Kingdom") is assigned a risk rating:
| Corridor Risk Factors | Examples |
|---|---|
| Source Country Risk | FATF compliance, corruption perception index, sanctions exposure |
| Destination Country Risk | Same as source |
| Historical Abuse Patterns | Known ML/TF typologies for this corridor |
| Provider AML Capabilities | Strength of provider's controls in source/destination countries |
| Transaction Characteristics | Typical amounts, velocity, purposes |
Corridor Risk Ratings:
| Rating | Examples | Monitoring Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Standard | UK → Germany (SEPA), France → Spain | Normal monitoring thresholds |
| Elevated | Nigeria → UK, Ghana → Germany | Reduced thresholds; more frequent reviews |
| High-Risk | Transfers involving FATF greylist countries | Manual review for all transactions >EUR 1,000; EDD at provider level |
| Prohibited | Transfers to/from comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions (e.g., North Korea, Iran) | Corridor not activated; transactions blocked |
3.3 Annual Risk Assessment Process
Timing: Conducted annually (Q1 of each calendar year) and updated upon:
- Launch of new corridors or services
- Significant regulatory changes (e.g., new FATF greylist additions)
- Provider incidents (e.g., AML enforcement actions against a provider)
- Internal incidents (e.g., detection of organized fraud)
Output: Written risk assessment report presented to Board, including:
- Summary of inherent risks
- Assessment of control effectiveness
- Residual risk rating
- Recommended control enhancements
- Resource requirements
4. Sanctions Screening
4.1 Sanctions Programs
PayWolt screens against the following sanctions lists:
| Sanctions List | Issuing Authority | Update Frequency | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|
| EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions List | European Union | Daily (via official EU API) | Individuals, entities, countries subject to EU sanctions |
| OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List | U.S. Department of Treasury | Daily (via OFAC API) | Individuals and entities blocked under US sanctions programs |
| OFAC Consolidated Sanctions List | U.S. Department of Treasury | Daily | All US sanctions programs (country-based, list-based) |
| UK Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets | UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) | Daily (via UK government API) | UK sanctions targets |
| UN Security Council Consolidated List | United Nations | Weekly | Individuals/entities associated with terrorism, proliferation |
4.2 Screening Points
Sanctions screening is performed at the following checkpoints:
| Event | Screening Target | Action on Match |
|---|---|---|
| Account Registration | User name, date of birth, nationality | Block registration; escalate to MLRO |
| Transfer Initiation (Quote Request) | Sender name; recipient name; recipient bank (if applicable) | Block quote generation; escalate |
| Corridor Validation | Source country; destination country | Block corridor access if sanctioned jurisdiction |
| Periodic Re-Screening | All active users | Quarterly batch screening; freeze accounts on new matches |
| List Updates | All users and recent transactions | Immediate screening upon list update; block matching accounts |
4.3 Screening Methodology
Name Screening:
- Fuzzy matching algorithm (minimum 85% similarity threshold)
- Phonetic matching (Soundex, Metaphone algorithms)
- Alias and alternate spelling matching
- Transliteration variants (e.g., Arabic, Cyrillic to Latin)
Date of Birth Matching:
- Exact match or within ±2 years (to account for data entry errors)
Nationality/Citizenship Matching:
- Exact match to sanctioned nationalities (where applicable)
4.4 Match Disposition
4.4.1 Confirmed Match (True Positive)
Immediate Actions:
- Block Transaction/Account Immediately: System automatically blocks the transaction and freezes the account.
- Escalate to MLRO: Automated alert sent within minutes; MLRO reviews within 1 hour.
- Do NOT Notify User: Per "tipping off" prohibitions, user is not informed of the sanctions match.
- Report to Authorities:
- EU sanctions: Report to Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (within 24 hours)
- OFAC sanctions: Consider voluntary self-disclosure to OFAC (if US nexus exists)
- Document all actions in compliance management system
4.4.2 Potential Match (Requires Investigation)
Procedure:
- Hold Transaction: Transaction placed in pending status (not executed).
- Gather Additional Information: Request additional identifying information from user (e.g., full legal name, passport number).
- Manual Review: AML Compliance Manager reviews match against additional data points.
- Disposition Decision: Within 24 hours, determine:
- True Positive: Follow 4.4.1 above.
- False Positive: Document rationale; add to whitelist; release transaction.
4.4.3 False Positive
Procedure:
- Document Rationale: Record why the match is deemed false (e.g., different date of birth, different nationality, common name).
- Clear Alert: Mark alert as "False Positive - Cleared."
- Whitelist (if appropriate): Add user to internal whitelist to prevent future alerts (reviewed quarterly).
4.5 Sanctions Compliance Governance
List Update Protocol:
- Automated daily downloads from official sources
- System alerts compliance team upon list changes
- Immediate batch re-screening of all active users upon list update
Audit Trail:
- All screening results logged with timestamps
- Disposition decisions recorded with rationale and approver name
- Quarterly audit of sanctions screening effectiveness
5. Transaction Monitoring and Pattern Detection
5.1 Purpose and Scope
PayWolt monitors transaction orchestration patterns (not payment execution, which is monitored by providers) to detect:
- Structuring / Smurfing: Users splitting large transfers across multiple corridors or time periods to evade detection
- Rapid Movement / Layering: Users sending funds through multiple corridors in quick succession (e.g., Nigeria → Germany → UK → Nigeria)
- Unusual Corridor Usage: Transfers through corridors with no logical economic purpose
- Velocity Abuse: Excessive transfer frequency inconsistent with stated purpose
- Provider Hopping: Users systematically avoiding provider-specific limits by switching providers
Important Distinction: PayWolt does NOT monitor individual payment transactions (e.g., card payments, bank transfers) - this is the responsibility of Collection and Payout Providers. PayWolt monitors the orchestration layer (which corridors, which providers, what patterns).
5.2 Monitoring Rules and Thresholds
5.2.1 Threshold-Based Rules
| Rule ID | Description | Threshold | Alert Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| TM-001 | High Single Transfer Amount | ≥EUR 10,000 equivalent | Alert to Compliance Team for review |
| TM-002 | Daily Cumulative Amount | ≥EUR 15,000 equivalent per user per day | Alert; request source of funds from provider |
| TM-003 | Weekly Cumulative Amount | ≥EUR 50,000 equivalent per user per week | Escalate to MLRO; consider STR |
| TM-004 | Monthly Cumulative Amount | ≥EUR 100,000 equivalent per user per month | Mandatory MLRO review; EDD required from provider |
Rationale: These thresholds align with EU Wire Transfer Regulation (EUR 1,000 for full information; EUR 10,000 for heightened scrutiny) and industry best practices.
5.2.2 Behavioral Pattern Rules
| Rule ID | Pattern Detected | Risk Indicator | Alert Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| TM-101 | Velocity Abuse - >5 transfers in 24 hours | Potential structuring or fraud | Alert; review user history |
| TM-102 | Round Amount Clustering - Multiple transfers of exact round amounts (e.g., EUR 5,000, EUR 10,000) | Layering or trade-based ML | Alert; investigate business rationale |
| TM-103 | Rapid Corridor Switching - User uses >3 different corridors within 7 days | Complex layering scheme | Escalate to MLRO |
| TM-104 | Midnight/Unusual Hour Transfers - Transfers initiated 00:00-05:00 local time | Automation or fraud | Alert if pattern persists |
| TM-105 | Provider Limit Evasion - User approaches provider-specific limit, then switches to different provider | Systematic evasion of controls | Escalate; may indicate sophisticated ML |
5.2.3 Geographic and Corridor Rules
| Rule ID | Pattern | Risk Level | Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| TM-201 | Transfer to/from FATF Greylist Country | Elevated | Automatic escalation; manual review required |
| TM-202 | Transfer involving High-Risk Jurisdiction (per Transparency International CPI <40) | High | MLRO review; EDD from provider |
| TM-203 | Circular Corridor Pattern - e.g., Nigeria → Germany → UK → Nigeria within 30 days | Very High | Potential layering; immediate MLRO review; likely STR |
| TM-204 | Transfer to Offshore Financial Center with no stated business purpose | High | Request explanation; escalate if unsatisfactory |
5.3 Alert Management Workflow
Transaction Orchestrated → Monitoring Rules Engine → Alert Generated?
│
├─► No Alert: Transaction proceeds
│
└─► Alert Generated
│
▼
L1 Analyst Review (24 hours)
│
┌─────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
Clear Alert Escalate to L2 Request Info from User
(Document Rationale) (Complex Pattern) (Via Provider or Direct)
│
▼
L2 Senior Analyst Review (48 hours)
│
┌─────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
Clear Alert Escalate to MLRO Enhanced Monitoring
(Potential STR) (Watchlist User)
│
▼
MLRO Review & Decision (72 hours)
│
┌─────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
Close Case File STR/SAR Account Closure / Exit
(No Suspicion) (Report to Hellenic FIU) (Terminate Relationship)
5.4 Investigation Procedures
For escalated alerts, the assigned investigator must:
-
Gather Transaction Data:
- Pull all transfers by the user in the past 90 days
- Identify all corridors used, amounts, recipients
- Check for patterns (timing, amounts, frequency)
-
Review User Profile:
- KYC status from provider (verification level, documents submitted)
- Stated purpose of account usage
- Self-declared occupation and income source
- Historical transaction patterns
-
Analyze Corridor Logic:
- Is there a logical economic reason for the corridor? (e.g., Nigerian national sending funds to family in Nigeria)
- Does the pattern suggest trade, employment, or personal remittances?
- Are amounts consistent with declared income?
-
Check External Sources:
- Adverse media search (Google, Lexis Nexis, World-Check if available)
- PEP status verification
- Social media review (LinkedIn, public profiles) for business verification
-
Provider Inquiry (if applicable):
- Request additional KYC from provider (source of funds, employment verification)
- Ask provider if they have flagged the user for suspicious activity
-
Document Findings:
- Prepare investigation report with timeline, findings, conclusion
- Recommend disposition: Clear, Monitor, Escalate to MLRO, or File STR
-
MLRO Decision:
- MLRO reviews investigation report
- Decides whether to file STR with Hellenic FIU
- Documents decision rationale
5.5 Alert Disposition Codes
| Code | Meaning | Definition | Action Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLEAR | Cleared - No Suspicion | Legitimate transaction pattern; no evidence of ML/TF | Document rationale; close alert |
| MONITOR | Enhanced Monitoring | Unusual but not suspicious; warrants ongoing observation | Add user to watchlist; lower alert thresholds |
| STR | Suspicious Transaction Report Filed | Suspicious activity identified; reported to FIU | File STR; maintain confidentiality (no tipping off) |
| EXIT | Relationship Terminated | Unacceptable ML/TF risk; business relationship ended | Close account; may file STR; offboard user |
| PEND | Pending - More Info Needed | Insufficient information to make determination | Request additional information from user or provider |
5.6 Performance Metrics and Tuning
Quarterly Metrics:
- Total alerts generated
- Alert-to-investigation ratio (target: <20% escalated to L2)
- Investigation-to-STR ratio
- False positive rate (target: <50%)
- Average time to disposition (target: L1 within 24 hours, L2 within 48 hours, MLRO within 72 hours)
Annual Rule Tuning:
- Review rules with high false positive rates
- Adjust thresholds based on user population growth
- Incorporate new ML/TF typologies from FATF, FIU guidance
6. Provider Due Diligence and Oversight
6.1 Provider AML/CTF Due Diligence
Before partnering with a payment service provider, PayWolt conducts comprehensive AML/CTF due diligence:
6.1.1 Initial Due Diligence Checklist
| Category | Information/Documentation Required | Verification Method |
|---|---|---|
| Regulatory Authorization | EMI/PI license; license number; regulator name; license validity | Verify on regulator's public register (e.g., NBB for Wise, CBN for Flutterwave) |
| AML/CTF Program | Copy of provider's AML/CTF policy; organizational structure; MLRO contact | Request from provider; review for adequacy |
| Sanctions Compliance | Sanctions screening procedures; list coverage; screening frequency | Request documentation; assess alignment with PayWolt standards |
| Transaction Monitoring | Description of transaction monitoring system; rules and thresholds | Request summary; evaluate sophistication |
| STR/SAR Filing | Number of STRs filed annually (if disclosable); FIU relationships | Request from provider (confidential) |
| Regulatory History | Any AML/CTF enforcement actions, fines, or regulatory findings in past 5 years | Public records search; ask provider to disclose |
| Beneficial Ownership | UBOs of provider (if not publicly listed) | Corporate registry search; provider attestation |
| PEP Exposure | Whether provider has PEP clients; EDD procedures for PEPs | Request documentation |
| Audits and Certifications | Recent AML/CTF audit reports (if shareable); ISO 27001, SOC 2 certifications | Request reports; verify certifications |
6.1.2 Provider Risk Rating
Based on due diligence findings, each provider is assigned a risk rating:
| Risk Rating | Criteria | Oversight Level |
|---|---|---|
| Low | Regulated in EU/UK/US; strong AML program; no recent enforcement actions; transparent operations | Annual re-certification; standard monitoring |
| Medium | Regulated in non-EU jurisdiction; adequate AML program; minor historical issues | Bi-annual re-certification; enhanced monitoring |
| High | Recent AML deficiencies; emerging market regulation; limited transparency | Quarterly re-certification; heightened oversight; escalation to CCO for approval |
| Prohibited | Unlicensed; significant AML enforcement history; uncooperative with due diligence | No partnership |
Current Provider Ratings (as of 2025-01-05):
- Wise (Belgium): Low Risk (EU-regulated EMI; strong AML program; transparent)
- Flutterwave (Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, SA): Medium Risk (African regulation; adequate AML program; cooperative)
- Stripe (US/EU): Low Risk (US/EU-regulated; robust AML controls; publicly documented program)
6.1.3 Ongoing Provider Monitoring
Annual Re-Certification:
- Request updated AML/CTF policy (if amended)
- Verify license remains valid
- Search for new enforcement actions or adverse media
- Review operational performance (incident reports, STR cooperation)
Event-Driven Reviews:
- Provider receives AML/CTF enforcement action → Immediate review; consider relationship suspension
- Provider changes ownership or regulatory status → Re-conduct initial due diligence
- Provider expands to new high-risk jurisdiction → Assess impact on PayWolt's risk profile
6.2 Provider AML/CTF Contractual Requirements
All provider agreements include the following AML/CTF provisions:
| Clause | Requirement |
|---|---|
| AML/CTF Compliance Warranty | Provider warrants it maintains an AML/CTF program compliant with applicable laws |
| Sanctions Screening | Provider agrees to screen all users against relevant sanctions lists |
| STR Filing Obligation | Provider agrees to file STRs with its regulator for suspicious activity (no obligation to share STRs with PayWolt due to tipping-off laws) |
| Cooperation with Authorities | Provider agrees to cooperate with law enforcement and regulatory inquiries |
| Right to Audit | PayWolt reserves the right to audit provider's AML/CTF controls (upon reasonable notice) |
| Incident Notification | Provider must notify PayWolt within 24 hours of any AML/CTF enforcement action, breach, or significant incident |
| Termination for Cause | PayWolt may terminate agreement if provider materially breaches AML/CTF obligations |
7. Suspicious Activity Reporting
7.1 Internal Reporting Obligation
All PayWolt employees have a duty to report suspicious activity to the MLRO. Suspicious activity includes:
| Indicator Category | Examples |
|---|---|
| User Behavior | User refuses to provide information; provides inconsistent information; appears coached |
| Transaction Patterns | Unusual patterns detected by monitoring rules (see Section 5); transactions with no apparent economic purpose |
| Evasion Tactics | User appears aware of reporting thresholds; structures transactions; uses multiple accounts |
| Knowledge of Crime | Employee becomes aware through public sources or user statements that user is involved in criminal activity |
| Sanctions Concerns | User has potential connection to sanctioned individual/entity/country (even if not a confirmed match) |
Internal Reporting Channel:
- Email: mlro@paywolt.com (encrypted)
- Confidential Hotline: [Confidential number for employees]
- Compliance Portal: Internal case management system
Protections for Reporters:
- Confidentiality maintained (reporter identity protected)
- No retaliation for good-faith reporting
- Whistleblower protection under Greek law and EU Whistleblower Directive (EU 2019/1937)
7.2 MLRO Evaluation and STR/SAR Filing
Upon receiving an internal report or escalated alert, the MLRO:
- Reviews Report/Alert: Gathers all relevant information, transaction data, investigation findings.
- Applies Legal Test: Determines whether there are "reasonable grounds to suspect" ML/TF (not "proof" or "knowledge" - suspicion is sufficient).
- Makes Filing Decision: Decides whether to file a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) / Suspicious Activity Report (SAR).
- Files STR (if applicable): Submits STR to appropriate Financial Intelligence Unit:
- Greece: Hellenic Authority for Combating Money Laundering (via dedicated reporting portal)
- Other EU: If transaction primarily relates to another EU member state, may file with that country's FIU (coordination with Hellenic FIU)
- UK (if applicable): National Crime Agency (NCA) via Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Online
- US (if applicable): FinCEN via BSA E-Filing System (if PayWolt has US nexus requiring SAR filing)
STR/SAR Content:
- User identifying information (name, date of birth, address, account number)
- Description of suspicious activity
- Amounts, dates, corridors, recipients involved
- Reason for suspicion (which ML/TF indicators triggered the report)
- Supporting documentation (transaction records, screenshots, investigation notes)
Timing:
- Greece: "Promptly" upon forming suspicion (interpreted as within 24-48 hours)
- UK: As soon as practicable after forming suspicion
- US: Within 30 calendar days of initial detection (if US SAR applies)
Record Keeping:
- Maintain copy of STR and all supporting documentation for 10 years (per Hellenic Law 4557/2018, Article 61)
- STRs stored in secure, access-controlled system (separate from general transaction records)
- Access limited to MLRO, CCO, and designated compliance staff
7.3 Prohibition on "Tipping Off"
Legal Prohibition:
Under Greek AML law (Law 4557/2018, Article 52) and AMLD5 (Article 39), it is a criminal offense to disclose to the user or any third party that:
- A STR has been filed or is being considered
- An AML/CTF investigation is underway
- Authorities have been notified or are investigating
Prohibited Actions:
- Informing the user that their account is under review for AML reasons
- Explaining that a transaction was blocked due to a STR filing
- Discussing STRs with colleagues not involved in the investigation
- Disclosing STR information to external parties (except authorities)
Permitted Actions:
- Informing user of general compliance requirements (e.g., "We need to verify source of funds for compliance purposes")
- Blocking a transaction for "compliance review" without specifying STR
- Discussing suspicions internally with MLRO/compliance team on a need-to-know basis
Penalties for Tipping Off:
- Criminal prosecution (imprisonment and/or fines)
- Regulatory sanctions
- Termination of employment
8. Record Keeping and Data Retention
8.1 Retention Periods
Pursuant to AMLD5 (Article 40) and Hellenic Law 4557/2018 (Article 61), PayWolt retains:
| Record Type | Retention Period | Storage Location | Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transaction Records (orchestration metadata: corridors, amounts, timestamps, provider references) | 10 years from transaction date | Secure database (encrypted at rest) | Hellenic Law 4557/2018, Art. 61(1) |
| User Account Data (name, email, phone, KYC status from provider, registration date) | 5 years after account closure or last transaction (whichever is later) | Secure database | AMLD5 Art. 40(1) |
| KYC Verification Metadata (verification status, provider reference ID, verification date - NOT identity documents, which are stored by providers) | 5 years after account closure | Secure database | AMLD5 Art. 40(1) |
| STR/SAR Filings and Supporting Documentation | 10 years from filing date | Encrypted archive; restricted access | Hellenic Law 4557/2018, Art. 61(3) |
| AML/CTF Investigations (alerts, investigation reports, dispositions) | 5 years from closure of investigation | Compliance case management system | Best practice; evidentiary purposes |
| Provider Due Diligence Records | 5 years from termination of provider relationship | Compliance document repository | Best practice |
| Training Records (attendance, completion certificates, assessments) | 5 years from training date | HR system | Best practice; regulatory examination preparedness |
| Risk Assessments (annual enterprise ML/TF risk assessments) | 5 years from publication date | Compliance repository | Best practice |
Note on KYC Documents: PayWolt does NOT retain identity documents (passports, driver's licenses, selfies, proof of address). These are stored exclusively by the payment service providers performing KYC, in accordance with their own retention obligations.
8.2 Data Security and Access Controls
Security Measures:
- Encryption: AES-256 encryption at rest; TLS 1.3 in transit
- Access Controls: Role-based access control (RBAC); only authorized compliance personnel access AML/CTF records
- Audit Logging: All access to AML/CTF records logged with timestamp and user ID
- Physical Security: Data hosted in SOC 2-compliant data centers (AWS)
- Segregation: STR/SAR records stored separately from general transaction data
Access Authorization:
- Transaction Records: Compliance team, finance (for reconciliation), senior management (read-only)
- STR/SAR Records: MLRO, CCO, designated compliance staff only
- Provider Due Diligence: CCO, AML Compliance Manager, senior management
8.3 Data Subject Requests and AML Exemptions
GDPR Right to Erasure ("Right to be Forgotten"):
Users may request deletion of their personal data under GDPR Article 17. However, PayWolt may refuse erasure if retention is necessary for:
- Legal Obligation: Compliance with AML/CTF retention requirements (GDPR Article 17(3)(b))
- Legal Claims: Establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims (GDPR Article 17(3)(e))
GDPR Right of Access:
Users may request access to their personal data under GDPR Article 15. However, PayWolt may refuse or limit access if disclosure would adversely affect:
- Prevention, detection, or investigation of crime (GDPR Article 23(1)(d)) - e.g., if providing STR information would constitute "tipping off"
- Important objectives of general public interest (GDPR Article 23(1)(e))
Procedure:
- User requests forwarded to privacy@paywolt.com
- Privacy team consults with CCO/MLRO before responding
- If request relates to data subject of STR/ongoing investigation: Refuse request; cite GDPR Article 23 exemption; do NOT disclose existence of STR
9. Training and Awareness
9.1 Training Program Structure
| Audience | Training Module | Frequency | Duration | Delivery Method |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All Employees | AML/CTF Fundamentals (ML/TF basics, red flags, reporting obligations) | Annual (mandatory) | 45 minutes | E-learning + quiz (passing score: 80%) |
| Customer Support | Enhanced Training (user interactions, information gathering, escalation) | Annual + ad hoc updates | 90 minutes | Live training + case studies |
| Compliance Team | Advanced AML/CTF (investigation techniques, STR writing, regulatory developments) | Quarterly | 2 hours | Live training + workshops |
| Senior Management | Governance and Regulatory Updates | Bi-annual | 1 hour | Executive briefing |
| Board of Directors | AML/CTF Oversight and Risk Appetite | Annual | 1 hour | Presentation by CCO/MLRO |
| New Hires | AML/CTF Onboarding (role-specific training) | Within 30 days of hire | 1-2 hours | E-learning + live session |
9.2 Training Content
Core Topics:
- What is money laundering and terrorist financing?
- Greece's AML/CTF legal framework (Law 4557/2018, AMLD5/6)
- PayWolt's AML/CTF Policy and procedures
- Red flags and suspicious activity indicators
- Internal reporting procedures and whistleblower protections
- Tipping off prohibition
- Sanctions screening and OFAC/EU sanctions
- Record keeping requirements
- Consequences of non-compliance (legal, regulatory, reputational)
Role-Specific Topics:
- Compliance: STR/SAR writing, investigation techniques, provider oversight
- Customer Support: How to handle unusual user requests; when to escalate
- Engineering: Secure data handling; implementing sanctions screening; monitoring system maintenance
9.3 Training Records and Compliance Tracking
Records Maintained:
- Employee name and role
- Training module(s) completed
- Completion date
- Assessment score (if applicable)
- Acknowledgment of Policy (signed annually)
Compliance Metrics:
- Training completion rate (target: 100% within 60 days of due date)
- Average assessment score
- Overdue training follow-up (automated reminders; escalation to manager after 30 days overdue)
Annual Report to Board:
- Training completion rates by department
- Assessment performance
- Training program updates and enhancements
10. Independent Testing and Audit
10.1 Internal Audit (Annual)
Scope:
- Policy and Procedure Compliance: Are procedures being followed?
- Sanctions Screening Effectiveness: Sample testing of screening results; false positive/false negative analysis
- Transaction Monitoring: Review alert generation, investigation quality, disposition accuracy
- Provider Oversight: Review provider due diligence files; verify annual re-certifications
- Record Keeping: Verify retention compliance; test access controls
- Training Compliance: Verify all employees completed training; review training materials for accuracy
Conducted By: Internal Audit function (independent of compliance team) OR external auditor
Deliverable: Written audit report with findings, recommendations, management responses, remediation timeline
Distribution: CCO, CEO, Audit Committee of the Board
10.2 External AML/CTF Review (Every 2-3 Years)
Scope:
- Independent assessment of AML/CTF program against regulatory requirements and industry best practices
- Gap analysis: Identify areas where program falls short of FATF Recommendations, AMLD5 requirements
- Benchmarking: Compare PayWolt's program to peer companies
- Scenario testing: Simulate ML/TF scenarios to test detection capabilities
Conducted By: Qualified external consultant (Big Four accounting firm, boutique AML consultancy)
Deliverable: Comprehensive report with findings, risk assessment, recommendations for enhancement
Action Plan: Management prepares action plan to address findings; progress reported to Board quarterly
10.3 Regulatory Examinations
Preparedness:
- Maintain examination readiness: organized records, accessible documentation
- Designated point of contact for regulators: CCO
- Cooperation protocol: Provide requested information promptly; make personnel available for interviews
Expected Regulators (given PayWolt's non-licensed status, examinations are less likely but possible):
- Hellenic Capital Market Commission (if deemed to provide payment-related services)
- Hellenic Authority for Combating Money Laundering (thematic reviews, investigations)
- Providers' regulators may inquire about PayWolt's controls as part of provider examination
Post-Examination:
- Document all findings and recommendations
- Develop remediation plan with timelines
- Report to Board
- Track remediation completion
11. ML/TF Typologies and Red Flags
11.1 Money Laundering Typologies Relevant to Cross-Border Remittances
| Typology | Description | Red Flags |
|---|---|---|
| Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) | Over/under-invoicing of goods to move value across borders | Large transfers with stated purpose "business payment" but no supporting documentation; inconsistent amounts relative to stated trade |
| Structuring / Smurfing | Breaking large transfers into smaller amounts to avoid detection thresholds | Multiple transfers just below EUR 10,000; frequent transfers of similar amounts; use of multiple corridors to same recipient |
| Layering | Moving funds through multiple jurisdictions to obscure origin | Circular corridor patterns (e.g., funds sent abroad and returned shortly after); use of multiple intermediaries |
| Integration | Placing illicit funds into legitimate economy | High-value transfers stated as "gift" or "family support" with no supporting relationship |
| Cash-to-Digital Conversion | Converting cash proceeds of crime into digital/bank funds | User collects cash locally and sends abroad via digital channels (relies on cash collection providers, which PayWolt does not use) |
| Sanctions Evasion | Using remittances to circumvent sanctions | Transfers to high-risk jurisdictions; use of shell companies or nominees; obfuscated beneficiary identities |
11.2 User-Level Red Flags
| Category | Red Flag | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|
| Identity & Verification | User reluctant to provide KYC to provider; provides inconsistent information | Medium |
| User uses disposable email, temporary phone number | Medium | |
| KYC verification fails multiple times | High | |
| Behavioral | User unusually knowledgeable about AML thresholds or procedures | High |
| User inquires about reporting requirements or monitoring | High | |
| User becomes defensive or hostile when asked for additional information | Medium | |
| User rushes transaction or demands immediate processing | Medium | |
| Transaction Purpose | Stated purpose doesn't match user profile (e.g., student sending large business payments) | Medium-High |
| Vague or inconsistent explanation of transfer purpose | Medium | |
| No apparent economic rationale for transfer (e.g., no family/business ties to destination country) | High | |
| Relationship | User asks for assistance in structuring transactions or evading limits | Very High |
| Third party attempts to conduct transaction on behalf of user | High |
11.3 Transaction-Level Red Flags
| Category | Red Flag | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|
| Amount | Transfer amount just below reporting threshold (e.g., EUR 9,900) | High |
| Sudden large transfer inconsistent with prior activity (e.g., user who normally sends EUR 500 suddenly sends EUR 50,000) | High | |
| Round number amounts (EUR 10,000, USD 20,000, etc.) | Medium | |
| Frequency | High velocity (>5 transfers per day; >20 per week) | High |
| Immediate re-initiation after transfer completes (rapid recycling) | High | |
| Corridor | Use of high-risk corridor with no stated connection to destination country | High |
| Transfers to multiple unrelated countries in short period | Medium-High | |
| Circular transfers (send abroad, receive back shortly after) | Very High | |
| Recipient | Different recipient for each transfer (no repeat recipients) | Medium |
| Recipients in multiple high-risk jurisdictions | High | |
| Recipient is a shell company, offshore entity, or money service business | High | |
| Timing | Transfers during unusual hours (e.g., 2:00 AM local time) | Low-Medium (may be legitimate for different time zones) |
| Immediate transfer after account funding (no dormancy period) | Medium |
11.4 Provider-Level Red Flags
| Red Flag | Risk Indicator |
|---|---|
| Provider receives AML/CTF enforcement action or fine | Provider's AML program may be deficient; heightened risk |
| Provider is uncooperative with due diligence requests | Lack of transparency; possible compliance issues |
| Provider operates in multiple high-risk jurisdictions without adequate local licensing | Regulatory arbitrage; heightened ML/TF risk |
| Provider's STR filing rate is abnormally low compared to industry peers | Possible under-reporting; ineffective monitoring |
| Adverse media reports about provider's involvement in ML/TF incidents | Reputational risk; possible control weaknesses |
12. High-Risk Jurisdictions and Geographic Risk
12.1 Jurisdiction Risk Classification Methodology
PayWolt classifies countries based on the following risk factors:
| Risk Factor | Data Source | Weighting |
|---|---|---|
| FATF Status | FATF Greylist (jurisdictions under increased monitoring); FATF Blacklist (high-risk jurisdictions) | High (automatic elevation) |
| Sanctions Status | Comprehensive sanctions by EU, UN, US, UK | Prohibited (automatic block) |
| Corruption Perception Index (CPI) | Transparency International CPI (scale 0-100; lower = more corrupt) | Medium (CPI <40 = elevated risk) |
| Financial Secrecy Index | Tax Justice Network FSI (higher = more secretive) | Medium (FSI >70 = elevated risk) |
| Mutual Evaluation Reports | FATF/FATF-Style Regional Body evaluations | Medium (non-compliant or partially compliant ratings = elevated) |
| AML/CTF Legislation | Existence and enforcement of AML/CTF laws | Medium (weak enforcement = elevated) |
| Political Stability | World Bank Governance Indicators | Low (instability may indicate weak rule of law) |
12.2 Jurisdiction Risk Categories
| Category | Criteria | Examples (Illustrative; subject to change) | Treatment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard Risk | EU/EEA member; FATF member with strong compliance; CPI >60 | Germany, France, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain | Normal processing; standard monitoring thresholds |
| Elevated Risk | Non-EU/EEA; CPI 40-60; moderate FATF compliance | Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico | Reduced thresholds (e.g., alert at EUR 5,000 instead of EUR 10,000); enhanced provider oversight |
| High Risk | FATF Greylist; CPI <40; weak AML enforcement | [Per FATF Greylist, updated quarterly - see Section 12.3] | Mandatory manual review for all transfers >EUR 1,000; EDD required from provider; senior approval |
| Prohibited | FATF Blacklist; Comprehensive sanctions (EU/UN/US/UK); State sponsor of terrorism | North Korea, Iran, Syria (sanctions); [Per FATF Blacklist] | Corridor not activated; transfers automatically blocked; no business conducted |
12.3 FATF Greylist Monitoring
Procedure:
- Monitor FATF website quarterly for Grey List updates
- Upon addition of country to Grey List:
- Update risk classification to "High Risk"
- Reduce monitoring thresholds for affected corridors
- Communicate to all users from that jurisdiction (via email): "We are implementing enhanced verification for transfers involving [Country]. Please ensure your provider has up-to-date KYC on file."
- Upon removal from Grey List:
- Re-assess risk classification (may remain Elevated if CPI <40)
- Adjust thresholds accordingly
Current FATF Grey List (as of December 2024; verify at fatf-gafi.org):
- [To be updated based on latest FATF publication]
12.4 Sanctions List Monitoring
Comprehensive Sanctions (No Business):
- OFAC (US): Crimea region of Ukraine, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
- EU: Syria, North Korea, Russia (partial; targeted sanctions)
- UN: North Korea, Central African Republic (partial), Democratic Republic of Congo (partial), etc.
Targeted Sanctions (Individual/Entity Level):
- Screened via sanctions lists in Section 4.1
- May permit transfers to country if counterparty is not sanctioned individual/entity
Sanction Updates:
- Real-time monitoring of sanctions announcements (OFAC, EU, UN, UK)
- Immediate corridor/user review upon new sanctions designation
13. Incident Response and Breach Notification
13.1 AML/CTF Incident Definition
An "AML/CTF Incident" includes:
- Failure of sanctions screening system (e.g., system outage; list update failure)
- Processing of transaction involving sanctioned individual/entity due to system/human error
- Delayed filing of STR/SAR beyond regulatory deadline
- Tipping-off violation (disclosure of STR to user or unauthorized party)
- Data breach involving AML/CTF records (STRs, investigation files, user KYC data)
- Discovery of employee involvement in ML/TF facilitation
13.2 Incident Response Procedures
Immediate Actions (Within 24 Hours):
- Containment: Stop processing affected transactions; suspend affected accounts if necessary
- Notification to MLRO/CCO: Employee discovering incident immediately notifies MLRO and CCO
- Preliminary Assessment: Determine scope, impact, root cause (preliminary)
- Preserve Evidence: Secure logs, records, communications related to incident
Investigation (Within 72 Hours):
- Root Cause Analysis: Investigate how incident occurred; identify control failures
- Impact Assessment: Determine number of affected transactions/users; financial impact; regulatory impact
- Regulatory Notification (if required):
- Sanctions violations: Report to relevant authority (OFAC, EU, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- Data breach: Report to Hellenic Data Protection Authority (if GDPR breach criteria met)
- STR delayed filing: File STR with explanation of delay; notify FIU
- Documentation: Incident report with timeline, findings, affected parties, corrective actions
Remediation (Within 30 Days):
- Corrective Actions: Implement fixes to prevent recurrence (system patches, procedure updates, retraining)
- User Notification (if applicable): If user data compromised, notify affected users (GDPR Article 34)
- Regulatory Follow-Up: Provide regulators with incident report and corrective action plan
- Board Notification: Report significant incidents to Board
13.3 Breach Notification Requirements
| Incident Type | Authority to Notify | Deadline | Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sanctions Violation (Processing transaction involving sanctioned party) | Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs; OFAC (if US nexus); EU (if EU sanctions) | Immediate (within 24 hours of discovery) | Identity of sanctioned party; transaction details; corrective actions |
| Data Breach (Personal data of >100 users compromised) | Hellenic Data Protection Authority (HDPA) | 72 hours of becoming aware (GDPR Art. 33) | Nature of breach; data categories affected; likely consequences; measures taken |
| STR/SAR Delayed Filing | Hellenic FIU (or relevant FIU) | With STR filing (include explanation) | Reason for delay; when suspicion arose; when STR filed |
| Tipping-Off Violation | Hellenic FIU; potentially law enforcement | Within 24 hours of discovery | Details of disclosure; to whom; potential impact on investigation |
14. Consequences of Non-Compliance
14.1 Legal and Regulatory Consequences
| Violation | Legal Basis | Potential Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Failure to Conduct Due Diligence | Hellenic Law 4557/2018, Art. 72 | Administrative fine up to EUR 5,000,000 or 10% of annual turnover |
| Failure to File STR | Hellenic Law 4557/2018, Art. 72 | Administrative fine; criminal prosecution (imprisonment up to 6 months) |
| Tipping Off | Hellenic Law 4557/2018, Art. 52 | Criminal offense: Imprisonment and/or fine |
| Sanctions Violation (EU) | EU Regulation 2580/2001; country-specific sanctions regs | Fine up to EUR 500,000 (or higher); criminal prosecution |
| Sanctions Violation (US) | OFAC regulations; 31 CFR 501.701 | Civil penalty up to USD 250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction; criminal prosecution (up to USD 1,000,000 fine + 20 years imprisonment) |
| Breach of Record Keeping Requirements | Hellenic Law 4557/2018, Art. 61 | Administrative fine up to EUR 1,000,000 |
14.2 Reputational and Business Consequences
- Loss of Provider Partnerships: Providers may terminate relationship if PayWolt demonstrates AML/CTF deficiencies
- Investor Confidence: AML incidents may deter investors or trigger contractual breaches (representations & warranties)
- User Trust: Public disclosure of AML failures damages brand and user confidence
- Regulatory Scrutiny: Increased regulatory examinations; potential license requirements imposed
14.3 Employee Consequences
| Violation by Employee | Potential Consequence |
|---|---|
| Failure to Report Suspicious Activity | Disciplinary action; termination; criminal liability (if knowledge of crime) |
| Tipping Off | Immediate termination for cause; criminal prosecution; personal fines/imprisonment |
| Falsifying AML/CTF Records | Immediate termination; criminal prosecution for fraud |
| Facilitation of ML/TF | Immediate termination; criminal prosecution; professional disqualification |
15. Policy Review and Amendment
15.1 Review Schedule
| Review Type | Frequency | Responsible Party | Approval Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Full Policy Review | Annual (Q1 of each year) | CCO + MLRO | Board of Directors |
| Procedural Updates | Quarterly (or as needed) | AML Compliance Manager | CCO |
| Regulatory Monitoring | Ongoing (daily for sanctions; monthly for legislation) | AML Compliance Manager | CCO (for material changes) |
| Incident-Driven Review | Immediate (following AML/CTF incident or audit finding) | CCO + MLRO | CEO; Board (if material) |
15.2 Triggers for Interim Review
- Regulatory Changes: New AML/CTF legislation or guidance issued by Greek authorities, EU, FATF
- Service Expansion: Launch of new corridors, especially high-risk jurisdictions
- Provider Changes: Addition or termination of payment service provider partnerships
- Incident or Breach: AML/CTF incident requiring control enhancements
- Audit Findings: Internal or external audit identifies gaps or recommendations
- Industry Developments: Emerging ML/TF typologies; peer incidents providing lessons learned
15.3 Amendment Process
- Draft Amendment: CCO or MLRO drafts proposed changes with rationale
- Internal Review: Legal, Compliance, Risk, and relevant business teams review
- Board Approval: Material changes (e.g., risk appetite, governance structure, prohibited activities) require Board approval
- Communication: Updated policy communicated to all employees via email; mandatory acknowledgment
- Training Update: Training materials updated to reflect changes; supplemental training provided if material
- Version Control: New version number assigned; revision history maintained
16. Definitions
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| AML | Anti-Money Laundering |
| CCO | Chief Compliance Officer |
| CDD | Customer Due Diligence - process of identifying and verifying customer identity |
| CTF | Counter-Terrorist Financing |
| EDD | Enhanced Due Diligence - higher level of scrutiny for high-risk customers/transactions |
| FATF | Financial Action Task Force - international AML/CTF standard-setting body |
| FIU | Financial Intelligence Unit - national authority receiving and analyzing STRs/SARs |
| KYC | Know Your Customer - identity verification requirements |
| ML | Money Laundering |
| MLRO | Money Laundering Reporting Officer |
| PEP | Politically Exposed Person - individual holding prominent public function |
| PF | Proliferation Financing - financing of weapons of mass destruction |
| SAR | Suspicious Activity Report (US terminology) |
| STR | Suspicious Transaction Report (EU/UK terminology) |
| TF | Terrorist Financing |
| Tipping Off | Unlawful disclosure to a user that a STR/SAR has been filed or investigation is underway |
| UBO | Ultimate Beneficial Owner - individual(s) with >25% ownership or control of an entity |
Document Control
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Version | 2.0 |
| Document Type | Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Policy |
| Effective Date | 2025-01-05 |
| Last Revised | 2025-01-05 |
| Next Scheduled Review | 2026-01-05 (Annual) |
| Owner | Chief Compliance Officer |
| Approved By | Board of Directors (2025-01-05) |
| Classification | Internal / Confidential / Compliance |
| Distribution | All PayWolt employees (mandatory reading); Board of Directors; external auditors (upon request) |
| Revision Notes | Complete rewrite for non-custodial remittance orchestration model. Clarifies division of AML/CTF responsibilities: PayWolt (platform-level sanctions screening, transaction pattern monitoring, provider oversight) vs. Providers (KYC, CDD, payment-level monitoring, STR filing). Reflects 3 initial providers (Wise, Flutterwave, Stripe). Investor-grade legal language for audit and regulatory review. |
| Related Documents | TERMS_OF_SERVICE.md, PRIVACY_POLICY.md, REGULATORY_CLASSIFICATION.md |
Acknowledgment
I acknowledge that I have read, understood, and agree to comply with this Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Policy.
Failure to comply with this Policy may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment, as well as potential criminal prosecution.
This Policy is confidential and proprietary to DONATION POS L.P. (trading as PayWolt). Unauthorized distribution or disclosure is prohibited.
This AML/CTF Policy reflects PayWolt's commitment to preventing money laundering and terrorist financing. While PayWolt is not a regulated payment institution, we implement robust controls appropriate to our role as a technology orchestration platform. For legal or regulatory guidance specific to AML/CTF compliance, consult qualified legal counsel or compliance advisors.